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Abstract
Declining welfare states and increasing privatization of the insurance sector are leaving an increasing number of people,
particularly in Europe, without insurance. In many countries, new initiatives like Friendsurance (Germany), Broodfonds
(the Netherlands), and Lemonade (US) have emerged to fill this gap. These initiatives, sometimes called peer-to-peer in-
surance, aim to make insurance fair, transparent, and social again. Resembling 19th-century mutuals, they pool premiums
in (small) risk-sharing pools. We compare eleven new mutuals with respect to their institutional, resource, and member
characteristics and find two broad typologies. The first bears themost resemblance to the 19th-centurymutuals:Members
are (partly) responsible for governance, there is no risk differentiation, premiums are fixed and low, and insurance payouts
cover basic expenses only and are not guaranteed. The second group, while also applying risk-sharing and redistribution
of unused premiums, is organized more like the present-day commercial insurers it reacted against, e.g., with refined In-
surTechmethods for risk differentiation and a top-downorganization.We thus pose that, while both groups of new insurers
reinvent the meaning of solidarity by using direct risk-sharing groups (as is central to the concept of mutuals), they have
different projected development paths—especially considering how, in case of further growth, they deal with problems
of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Keywords
collective action; institutions; insurance; mutualism; resilience; risk-sharing; solidarity; welfare state
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Institutions of Inclusion and Exclusion” edited by J. Cok Vrooman (Utrecht University and
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research|SCP, the Netherlands) and Marcel Coenders (Utrecht University and The
Netherlands Institute for Social Research|SCP, the Netherlands).
© 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Be it in the fields of climate and energy, health care
and welfare states, politics and governance, or banking
and insurance, when it comes to solving collective prob-
lems, the shortcomings of market and state have increas-
ingly come to light. Over the past two decades, this has
sparked a revival in collective action in many countries
globally, displayed by the rapid increase in the number
of cooperatives in agriculture, energy, and infrastructure.
People are joining forces to establish and strengthen in-
stitutions for collective action (ICAs) to solve problems
that have not been solved to their satisfaction by tradi-
tional suppliers (De Moor, 2015).
Parallel to this development in collective resource
management, similar developments in the service sec-
tor can be noted, particularly in insurance, where new
initiatives such as Friendsurance (Germany), Broodfonds
(the Netherlands), and Lemonade (US) emerged out of a
mounting discontent with the way insurance is currently
organized. These insurance organizations, many of which
refer to themselves as peer-to-peer (P2P) insurance,
aim to reinstate fair, transparent, and social insurance.
Although their name suggests a one-on-one relationship
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between those involved, in practice they go back to
mutual insurance principles as laid down centuries ago,
pooling premiums in (small) risk-sharing pools that intro-
duce many-to-many relationships between members.
Historically, the earliest mutual insurance associa-
tions (mutuals) can be traced back to the guilds in the
first wave of collective action in early modern times
(1500–1800), but the current initiatives emulate the mu-
tuals that emerged over the 19th century during the sec-
ond wave of collective action, with its culmination in
1880–1920 (De Moor, 2015). Friendsurance (Germany),
for instance, evokes villagers that establishedmutual risk-
sharing arrangements in the event of fire, where neigh-
bors would help build a new home, while Axieme (Italy)
takes the fishermen and ship owners that helped each
other by puttingmoney in a common treasury for boat re-
pairs as its example. That they do not refer to the earlier
guild insurance is because the 19th-century mutuals usu-
ally focused on insurance services only, whereas guilds
formed multi-purpose organizations in which insurance
was part of a larger package of collective services (van
Gerwen & van Leeuwen, 2000).
Following their 19th-century counterparts, we ob-
serve that the new initiatives generally base their insur-
ance model on four principles: solidarity, transparency,
fairness, and innovation. Solidarity is invoked by rely-
ing on risk-sharing in subgroups, with policyholders sup-
porting each other with money from a common fund.
Transparency is achieved by abandoning the large bu-
reaucratic systems and making do with minimum sets of
rules and clarity about insurance eligibility and payouts.
Fairness is implemented by returning (some share of) un-
used premiums to the policyholder rather than to the
insurer’s profit. Innovation, finally, is where the new ini-
tiatives move beyond the historical model. Based on the
assumption that 21st-century InsurTech (e.g., online ex-
change platforms, artificial intelligence, blockchain) has
a primarily positive impact on collective action, they ap-
ply this to create large solidarity networks in our cur-
rent societies.
With this article, we aim to provide a better under-
standing of why these new initiatives are emerging, and
in so many different countries. What needs do they re-
spond to? Do they represent a revival of mutualism or is
this an entirely new institutional development? Can we
expect these initiatives to play a role in the insurance sec-
tor of the future? With the ‘oldest’ initiative established
in 2006, there is little experience to base such predic-
tions on. However, we do have a wealth of knowledge
on the development of mutuals in the past. By compar-
ing characteristics of mutuals past and present as well
as contextual developments leading to their rise (and
demise), we aim to provide preliminary insights into the
role these new initiatives play in our current societies,
their future chances, and what factors appear crucial for
their resilience.
A historical outlook is particularly helpful in refer-
ence to classic insurance problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when insured
people increase risky behavior or decrease loss preven-
tion (ex ante moral hazard; Arrow, 1971) or file exag-
gerated or even fraudulent insurance claims (ex post
moral hazard; Adams, Andersson, Jia, & Lindmark, 2011).
Adverse selection occurs when insurances attract an
above-average number of high-risk members (Akerlof,
1970). The general consensus is that historically, mutuals
were better able to deal with these problems than early
market and government insurers (Emery & Emery, 1999;
Harris, 2012). The ascribed reasons (social control, fair-
ness, solidarity) are what the new initiatives likewise use
as arguments for their case. While it is too early to state
whether they succeeded in this mission, we can compare
whether they are likely or certain to get into trouble due
to their institutional structure.
For this purpose, we compare eleven insurance initia-
tives (currently) active in twelve countries, established
between 2006–2018, on the basis of their institutional,
resource, and user properties, which are derived fromDe
Moor’s (2015) three-dimensional model of resilience in
ICAs. First, however, we lay the contextual groundwork
by sketching the relevant wider economic, societal, and
institutional embeddedness of these initiatives. Why are
they emerging now? What pressing issues in the insur-
ance sector are they responding to? Similarly, we provide
a general outline of the historical development of mutu-
als. Only in comparison canwe start to understandwhich
role the new initiatives, still in their infancy, may take in
our future societies.
2. The Wider Insurance Landscape
2.1. The Crisis of the Insurance System
When it comes to national insurance systems, coun-
tries have traditionally been categorized as utilizing pri-
vate (US), public (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark,
UK, Italy, Canada), or mixed (Germany, France, Austria,
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands) models for orga-
nizing insurance (Lameire, Joffe, & Wiedemann, 1999).
This classification marks how the majority of insur-
ance is organized; all countries with established in-
surance systems at least offer some form of pub-
lic insurance—particularly for unemployment, disability,
and retirement—for some subgroups (e.g., Medicaid in
the US). Private insurers, however, are quickly gaining
ground in all (particularly European) countries, as prin-
ciples of neoliberalism have provided the economic justi-
fication for delegating the provision of social insurance
(like health insurance) to private insurers (Natalier &
Willis, 2008). While this process might seem more ap-
parent in ‘mixed insurance’ countries, it is also taking
place in countries (such as Sweden) that have tradition-
ally been characterized as public (Sunesson et al., 1998).
At the same time, little has been done to accom-
modate new risks introduced by recent demographic
transitions. Aging populations (longer retirement, elderly
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care), higher divorce rates (child support), and increas-
ing unemployment put pressure on the capacity of the
welfare state (de Vroom & Øverbye, 2017; Parkinson,
2011). Moreover, while universalist benefits are, in prin-
ciple, at everyone’s disposal, their implementation in-
creasingly causes social exclusion. Eligibility is depen-
dent on citizenship and salaried employment, which con-
flicts with changing demographic profiles of a global-
ized world (Taylor-Gooby, 2006). The condition of citizen-
ship, for one, excludes the growing number of (labor) mi-
grants from social benefits in most European countries
(Baldini, Gallo, Reverberi, & Trapani, 2016; Lehtonen &
Liukko, 2015): While there are large differences between
European countries in the extent of exclusion, with exclu-
sion in most Mediterranean countries double or triple
the size of that in Scandinavian countries, exclusion is
substantial everywhere (Baldini et al., 2016). The con-
dition of salaried employment, secondly, deprives the
growing number of self-employed workers of benefits,
leaving them uninsured or at the mercy of private insur-
ance companies (van der Linden, 2008).
These private insurers introduce increasingly de-
tailed forms of risk segmentation by unpooling risks
(Ericson, Barry, & Doyle, 2000). While based on princi-
ples of actuarial fairness (i.e., you pay according to your
needs), this mainly serves to increase profit. The reper-
cussions of such differentiation are that premiums have
become increasingly expensive for high-risk groups, if
they are accepted as clients at all. Hence, the groups of
people that are excluded from insurance expand, and
those who do have insurance report lower levels of trust
in their insurer (Lehtonen & Liukko, 2015).
The new insurance initiatives, therefore, respond
to problems with both state and private insurance ar-
rangements. By borrowing aspects of historical mutual-
ism, they believe they can reshape expectations of insur-
ance and alleviate some of the financial pressures that
make the benefits offered by existing parties so expen-
sive (or unaffordable).
2.2. A Historical Mutual Insurance Framework
Risk-sharing through mutual insurance has been around
for so long that to summarize it in a few paragraphs is
impossible within the limits of this article. For excellent
discussions of mutuals throughout history, we refer the
interested reader to the book of van Leeuwen (2016).
For this article, which puts new mutuals central, a basic
overview suffices.
The mutuals that emerged in the early 19th cen-
tury were the product of age-old mutually dependent
social relations that took shape in local guilds and credit
economies (Ismay, 2015). These mutuals arose in many
different countries, but scholarly discussions largely fo-
cus on mutuals in Europe (e.g., the UK, the Netherlands,
Spain), the US, and Australia (Downing, 2012; Harris,
2012). In these discussions, scholars often distinguish be-
tween mutuals that covered life risks (e.g., health, fu-
neral) and non-life risks (e.g., fire, agriculture). While
membership figures tentatively suggest that risk-sharing
groups in the latter were smaller (van Gerwen & van
Leeuwen, 2000; also according to the authors, at least
for the Netherlands, membership figures suggest that,
in general, non-life mutuals had less than 100 mem-
bers, while the majority of life mutuals had fewer than
500 members), the general consensus is that all early
mutuals had relatively small risk-sharing pools, which
gave them a comparative advantage over early market
or government insurers in dealing with problems of ad-
verse selection and moral hazard (both ex ante and ex
post), as signaled by the lower number of claims (Adams
et al., 2011; Emery & Emery, 1999; Harris, 2012; van
Leeuwen, 2016).
The risk-sharing groups were usually composed of
people who lived in the same community, so they could
vouch for each other and monitor each other’s behavior
(van Gerwen & van Leeuwen, 2000). This reduced prob-
lems of adverse selection, as they had a rough estimate
of the type of risk admitted in the pool. Once admitted,
memberswere expected to take on some responsibility in
governance and to participate in social events (Downing,
2012). Thus, traditional mutualism consisted not only of
voluntary arrangements to contribute to a common fund
(de Swaan & van der Linden, 2006, p. 184), but served
social needs as well (Harris, 2012, pp. 1–2). The social
bonds and affinity that were created this way kept oc-
currences of moral hazard low, as it felt wrong to most
people to take (excessive amounts of) money from their
fellow group members. Moreover, informal monitoring
and social punishments (e.g., loss of reputation) scared
off those who might have still been inclined to do so.
As the 20th century approached, the membership
figures of mutuals grew quickly. This increased or-
ganizational complexity, which in many cases meant
that traditional ownership structures were modified to
ease decision-making and minimize potential conflicts.
Ultimately, this often entailed a transition towards man-
agerial and corporate governance models, in which the
management was in the hands of a managerial board
consisting of external professionals. In most organiza-
tions, members only retained—to some degree—ex post
decision control (Chaddad& Iliopoulos, 2013).Moreover,
despite the fact that the large mutuals were initially of-
ten structured like umbrella organizations, with mem-
bers still subdivided within multiple, relatively small risk-
sharing groups, conviviality within these groups quickly
waned,which reduced their ability tomonitor each other
(Downing, 2012).
Essentially, this means that mutual insurance had a
different definition in the early 1800s than it does today,
and this is a consequence of the evolution mutuals have
gone through over the past two centuries. Nowadays it
is usually the large, private, not-for-profit insurance com-
panies (such as the US-based Liberty Mutual Group) that
come to mind (de Swaan & van der Linden, 2006, p. 12).
Many of these companies evolved from 19th-century
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small-scale mutuals (van Leeuwen, 2016).1 Their defin-
ing characteristic still is that they are (partly) owned by
their stakeholders and have—at least on paper—a re-
sponsibility to them for their operations (Lehtonen &
Liukko, 2015). Members are, for instance, given the right
to select management, and any profit should either go
to them or into the company. This is in contrast to stock
insurers, which are owned by shareholders and usually
see the production of wealth for shareholders as their
primary function (Cummins,Weiss, & Zi, 1999). However,
while ownership has always been central tomutual insur-
ance, the actual voice members have in organizational
matters has decreased to such a degree that nowadays it
is largely void of meaning (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013).
Moreover, the meaning of solidarity gradually changed
in the evolution of mutual insurance companies. Large-
scale anonymous structures have come to replace the
old systems, which were smaller and more focused on
direct solidarity.
It is the traditional conception of mutual insurance
that fits well with the new insurance initiatives. They, too,
revert to subdividing the member-base into smaller risk-
sharing groups, thereby promoting solidarity and giving
the policyholders, to varying degrees, a say in the design
of the institution (albeit not necessarily through owner-
ship). Hence, while they explicitly present themselves as
different from mutual insurance companies, which they
treat on a parwith stock insurers, the term ‘peer-to-peer’
mightmainly be amodern rebranding of the age-old prin-
ciple of mutualism.
Essentially, while for mutual insurance companies
the defining feature that survived over time is formal
ownership by immediate stakeholders (and by extension
that profits are retained within the company), the new
initiatives borrow solidarity-related aspects (risk-sharing
groups, redistribution mechanisms) from the historical
model that they consider apt for reducing moral hazard.
A cautionary note is in place here, for although these as-
pects indeed made many historical mutuals successful,
the same reliance on small groups and informal social
control imposed fragility. If moral hazard did occur un-
detected, for small mutuals it more often led to finan-
cial problems or even bankruptcy (de Swaan & van der
Linden, 2006; van Leeuwen, 2016). Larger market insur-
ers might have had more moral hazard occurrences, but
also had the financial stability to cope with them.
3. Theory
A comparison of the new insurance initiatives requires
a common framework. The initiatives in different coun-
tries largely developed independently, so such a frame-
work helps to pinpoint differences and (particularly) sim-
ilarities that may not be obvious at first. For this purpose,
we apply the three-dimensional framework of De Moor
(2015), originally developed for historical analysis of the
functioning of commons and other ICAs, to mutuals. We
see structural similarities between mutuals and ICAs, so
this framework can reveal where the institutions are
more fragile. The framework poses that three dimen-
sions should be considered when evaluating coopera-
tion for the production, use, and management of a col-
lective good: the resource, the users, and the institu-
tion. Applied tomutuals, these reflect the insurance pool,
the policyholders, and themutual. These dimensions are
tightly interrelated and resilient cooperation is the result
of striking a proper balance between them.
The institution entails the overarching organizational
form as well as all rules and regulations regarding
both user and resource. The resource dimension encom-
passes everything related to the construction and use of
the resource, i.e., the premiums (that together form the
insurance pool) and insurance payouts. Finally, the user
dimension concerns who makes up the member-base,
i.e., whether the group is open or closed, small or large,
homogeneous or heterogeneous. There aremyriad inter-
relations between these dimensions: Group characteris-
tics follow from institutional rules of entrance; resource
characteristics are the result of institutional rules and
users’ demands and needs; resource and institutional
characteristics influence which users join, and so forth.
These interrelations are captured by the balance in effi-
ciency, utility, and equity (Figure 1).
Since insurance primarily serves to protect against fi-
nancial loss, efficiency is often the main balance consid-
ered. Literature that disputes the premises of the tragedy
of the commons (Hardin, 1968) stresses that institutions,
with properly defined rules and norms, are vital to avoid-
ing overuse and thus to not overriding the resource’s
carrying capacity. Efficiency then results from the inter-
action between institution and resource, as the institu-
tion sets the rules of access and use that largely deter-
mine resource availability (Ostrom, 2005). For mutuals,
these rules arrange financial matters of creating the fund
(e.g., setting premium levels) and payout from the fund
(e.g., determining coverage and eligibility). They should
ensure that no more is claimed than is saved in the pool,
but should simultaneously avoid underuse. When more
is saved than is needed for payouts, premiums are too
high and the balance is likewise inefficient. For historical
mutuals, efficiency clearly improved over time. Initially
there was little knowledge on how many claims should
be expected, what contribution rates were necessary to
cover those claims, and how eligibility should be judged.
Over time, the mutuals started to professionalize by ap-
plying basic risk differentiations on crude categories of,
for instance, age. Current mutual insurance companies
maximize efficiency by using complex tools to calculate
1 This is not to say that all 19th-century mutuals grew into large mutual insurance corporations. In fact, only a minority (mainly those that merged and
professionalized) survived. Following intensifying public debates over what voluntary mutuals lacked (e.g., no coverage of prime risks like old age and
industrial accidents), the vast majority were taken over by the welfare state (which would cover a broader variety of risks). Others, particularly in the
non-life domain, ultimately, had to cease operations in competition with commercial insurers (van Leeuwen, 2016).
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Figure 1. A three-factor approach to the functioning of mutuals, adapted from De Moor (2015). Note: R stands for
Resilience.
individual risk probabilities and adjusting premiums ac-
cordingly. Moreover, they reinsure part of the premiums
with external insurance companies who pay the insur-
ance if the local pool were still to be depleted.
In addition to financial performance, social aspects
form important indicators for the functioning of mutu-
als and other ICAs. In the framework, this is captured
in the evaluation of utility and equity. Utility represents
the balance between users and resource. Rather than as-
sessing resource management, utility asks whether the
resource is sufficient for the users’ needs. For the his-
torical mutuals, utility was achieved by combining vari-
ous types of support. While it is true that initially pay-
out was usually limited (both in amount and duration),
being able to receive some benefits did alleviate mem-
bers’ most urgent needs (Emery & Emery, 1999; Harris,
2012). Moreover, while coverage was not guaranteed,
this was compensated for with additional services (e.g.,
social support). Over time, financially utility improved as
payouts got higher and more secure, but the utility de-
rived from social functions decreased. Moreover, while
the introduction of risk differentiation may have been
positive for low-risk groups, for others it meant that in-
surance became more expensive. In other words, utility
may be perceived in differentways and vary amongmem-
bers within a mutual group.
Lastly, equity is achievedwhenusers feel heard. It has
long been recognized that ICAs in which members par-
ticipate in the decision-making process are more likely
to survive because involvement enhances reciprocity
and solidarity (Ostrom, 1990). It bestows feelings of re-
sponsibility in members and makes them committed to
the institution’s success. Moreover, institutions charac-
terized by member involvement appear more resilient
as they are better capable of change than those gov-
erned top down (De Moor, 2015), most likely because
involved members better understand why, and which,
changes are needed. For historical mutuals, equity was
initially given a key role (through bottom-up organiza-
tion and decision-making). Over time, it seems that im-
provements in efficiency have come at the expense of
equity, as these changes were set in motion by profes-
sional board members or external managers.
In general, resilient institutions manage to balance
equity, efficiency, and utility. In practice, however, bal-
ance is often achieved on two of these at the expense
of the third (De Moor, 2015). For the historical mutuals,
for instance, equity and utility seemed to have come at
the expense of efficiency in the early 19th century, while
efficiency replaced equity throughout the 20th century.
We assess such matters for the new initiatives as well.
By comparing the new insurance alternatives on the use
of risk differentiation, reinsurance methods, and strate-
gies for profit (i.e., characteristics of the resource and the
institution) we assess their balance regarding efficiency.
Risk differentiation and redistribution policies (part of
the fairness goal of all initiatives) will be used as indica-
tors for how the initiatives work towards utility. Finally,
how governance decisions are made and whether policy-
holders have a say in drafting their rules help us assess
the role they give to equity.
4. Methods
The number of new mutual-like organizations is rapidly
increasing, although most are (still) small in size. More-
over, while they use digital tools for their organization,
most still focus on local (national) markets, communicat-
ing in their respective languages, which makes it difficult
to get a count of the number of active initiatives. Our in-
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ventory of new insurance initiatives was based on men-
tions in blogs and news reports as well as presence on so-
cial media (Twitter/Facebook). For this purpose, we used
the search terms ‘peer-to-peer OR P2P OR crowdsurance
OR new’ and ‘mutuals OR mutualism OR insurance.’
We inventoried 57 initiatives (active and inactive,
see Tables A1 and A2 in the Supplementary File) that
were established between 2006–2018, with the major-
ity (39) founded in 2015 or later. With the exception
of Latin America and most of Africa—where local micro-
insurances are ubiquitous, but no accounts of institu-
tionalized and digitalized initiatives were found, possi-
bly because their insurance sectors are less developed
generally and internet penetration rates are low(er)—
comparable initiatives are being established everywhere.
The majority are European, although some of the pio-
neers started outside of Europe (e.g., TongJuBao in China,
PeerCover in New Zealand) and several initiatives (e.g.,
Teambrella, VouchForMe, WorldCover) ignore national
borders altogether.
Of the 57 initiatives, we selected 11 for a more thor-
ough review (Table 1), simply because we could collect
sufficient information about them. For the others, web-
sites provided too little information, content was only
available in foreign languages, and/or we could not get
in touch with a representative of the organization. The
selected initiatives cover different parts of the world as
well as different insurance products. Still, we note that
caution is warranted in contemplating these initiatives’
success, as most new mutuals, with the exception of
Friendsurance (∼ 150,000 policyholders) and Lemonade
(∼ 425,000), have a relatively small member-base (with
Versicherix not even officially launched yet).
4.1. Measures
To compare the institution, resource, and user dimen-
sions of the insurance organizations, we derive two or
three characteristics per dimension. For the institution,
we compare whether the initiatives use non-profit (e.g.,
cooperative, association) or for-profit (stock insurance)
organizational forms and to what extent users are in-
volved in decision-making. For the resource dimension,
we outlinewhether the initiatives use risk-differentiation
and reinsurance and what share of the premium they
potentially redistribute over the users. The user dimen-
sion, finally, is characterized by outlining whether the
initiatives set limits to group size and whether the ini-
tiatives devise and promote means of communication
among members.
5. Results
5.1. Basic Characteristics
Table 1 signals that the new initiatives offer a broad
range of insurance, both in the life and non-life domain.
Particularly noteworthy is that several explicitly state
that they insure everything, includingwhat is not insured
by other insurers or the welfare state (e.g., pet or family
insurance). Sometimes this alternative insurance offer is
how they market themselves (e.g., the family insurance
of TongJuBao). Others merely create the platform and in-
vite (groups of) people to use this platform for any insur-
ance they have in mind (e.g., Besure).
In the non-life domain, there is an emphasis on insur-
ance types that enable some form of standardized risk
differentiation and have relatively stable, mostly one-off
insurance payouts (e.g., motor, pet, or travel insurance).
These insurance types may be particularly suitable for
mutual insurance, because they lower the uncertainty
with respect to how much insurance is needed when
claims are filed and for how long.
In the life domain, most mutuals historically focused
onburial insurance, because allmembers need it at some
point and moral hazard will be limited. When health
insurance was offered, this was made feasible through
minimal coverage that was capped at a limited number
of consecutive months (van Leeuwen, 2016). We see
this strategy in use again for the new insurance types
that insure health or disability. These organizations are
a direct response to the privatization of insurance that
was previously offered by the welfare state. Broodfonds,
for instance, started after the Dutch state abolished the
Disability Act for self-employed workers in 2004. With
this abolishment, the Netherlands no longer offered so-
cial security arrangements for self-employed workers to
cover sickness and disability. Instead of taking out a
disability insurance with a private insurance company
(which for most self-employed workers is too expensive),
the Broodfonds emerged as a cheaper and social alterna-
tive. The insurance provided is usually only a minimum
income replacement and for a certain number ofmonths
(e.g., two years for the Dutch Broodfonds). This way, they
make insuring more unpredictable risks manageable.
5.2. Institutional, Resource, and User Features
Before reflecting on overall balance, we outline themain
institutional, resource, and user features, categorizing
the initiatives based on two or three characteristics. For
more detailed information per initiative, we refer the
reader to Tables A3–A5 in the Supplementary File.
With regard to the institution, a dichotomy arises
when we compare the initiatives based on their orga-
nizational form and decision-making structure (Table 2).
All top-down-organized initiatives are start-ups by en-
trepreneurs wishing to disrupt the insurance sector with
a model that, institutionally, maintains the standard, for-
profit structure (albeit as social enterprise in the case of
SharePeople), but introduces innovations mainly in user
and resource characteristics. Initiatives with bottom-up
structures, on the contrary, started as local solutions
that later scaled to associations or cooperatives (e.g.,
Broodfonds, CommonEasy) or were designed within the
platform-economy movement before looking for users
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Table 1. Overview of new mutuals included in review, sorted by founding year.
Year (founded)
P2P insurer * launched Country # Policy-holders Type of insurance
Broodfonds (2006) 2011 Netherlands > 20,000 Life: Income protection for self-employed
workers
Friendsurance 2010 Germany, Australia ∼ 150,000 Non-life: Deductibles of insurance offered
by 175 insurance partners (e.g., household,
liability, motor)
CommonEasy (2014) 2016 Netherlands < 1,000 Life: Income protection for self-employed
workers
TongJuBao 2014 China ** > 20,000 Life: Divorce; child abduction; family
migration
Lemonade (2015) 2016 US ∼ 425,000 Non-life: Renters’; home
Teambrella 2015 International *** < 500 Non-life: Motor; bicycles; pets
Versicherix (2015) Switzerland 0 Anything policyholders need insured
Axieme 2016 Italy > 2,000 Anything policyholders need insured (e.g.,
professional risk; casualty & property)
Besure 2016 Canada Not disclosed Anything policyholders need insured
Tribe 2016 Norway > 2,500 Non-life: House; furniture; motor; health;
travel; pets
SharePeople 2017 Netherlands < 1,000 Life: Income protection for self-employed
workers
Notes: * Added only if the launch year differs from the founding year; ** TongJuBao is looking for a market in Europe and the US under
the name P2P Connect; *** Teambrella is currently active in Argentina, Germany, Peru, Russia, the Netherlands, and the US.
that would shape the actual rules of governance (e.g.,
Besure, Teambrella). These initiatives make the users
responsible by involving them in the design of opera-
tional rules.
Roughly the same categories apply for the resource
characteristics. The top-down insurers use InsurTech
technologies to calculate individual risk profiles, which
are refined over time and translate into highly differen-
tiated premium levels. Moreover, they cooperate with
established insurers to guarantee payout when the local
insurance pool is exhausted (Table 3). This is how they
claim to provide high utility for everyone, but for low-risk
groups in particular (for whom extensive risk differenti-
ation should generate lower premiums than with regu-
lar insurers).
The bottom-up initiatives start instead from the
premises of equality and inclusion and do not differen-
tiate based on (in their opinion) subjective risk profiles.
To keep premiums low, their payouts usually do not pro-
vide full coverage; instead, they primarily want to make
minimal support available to everyone. Therefore, they
do not cooperate with established insurers for exter-
nal reinsurance either. The larger (and older) initiatives
(Broodfonds and TongJuBao) do have internal reinsur-
ance systems that operate across the risk-sharing groups,
but initially all mutuals in this category pose the basic risk
that payouts are not guaranteed: If the pool is depleted,
losses are not covered.
A resource characteristic that distinguishes all new
initiatives from regular insurers is their use of redistribu-
Table 2. Categorization based on organizational form and decision-making structure.
Organizational form
Social enterprise, association,
For-profit, stock (platform) cooperative
Decision-making
Provider Axieme, Friendsurance, Lemonade, SharePeopleTribe, Versicherix
Both Broodfonds, CommonEasy, TongJuBao
User Besure, Teambrella
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Table 3. Categorization based on risk differentiation and reinsurance policies.
Risk differentiation
Yes No
Reinsurance
External Axieme *, Friendsurance, Lemonade **,Tribe, Versicherix
Internal Lemonade 2 Broodfonds, TongJuBao
None Besure, CommonEasy, SharePeople, Teambrella
Notes: * Axieme, Friendsurance, and Tribe act as brokers so reinsurance is arranged by the insurance carrier they connect the policy-
holder to; ** Lemonade uses external reinsurance as backup for internal reinsurance.
tion policies. Based on a fairness notion that premiums
contributed to the pool are onlymeant for insurance pay-
outs, all initiatives return at least some share of the un-
used premiums at the end of the term (usually one year).
While we do observe that the maximum redistribution
share is lower for the for-profit initiatives (which also in-
vest part of the premium in external reinsurance), the
share is substantial everywhere (Figure 2).
For member characteristics, finally, we find that com-
munication within risk-sharing groups is possible (and
stimulated) only in the bottom-upmutuals (Table 4), who
base this on the idea that communication fosters com-
mitment directly by creating agreement on rules and pay-
outs, and indirectly by fostering cohesion and solidar-
ity. However, when we divide the initiatives based on
whether or not they pose restrictions on the maximum
size of risk-sharing groups, the resulting division cannot
be explained. The initiatives that pose such restrictions
are Besure (which compels groups to set limits, but gives
them freedom to decide on these limits), Broodfonds
(20–50 members), Friendsurance (exactly 10), and Tribe
(at most 10).
While the chosen limits vary per initiative, they are
implemented out of a belief that the number of people
towards which solidarity can be invoked is limited.When
group members are anonymous or when groups exceed
a boundary beyond which social norms can no longer be
maintained, risk-sharing is no longer believed to reduce
moral hazard. The other initiatives, contrarily, believe in
the strength of large numbers and argue that solidarity
is not directed towards specific others but generalized
to the group as a whole. This is an interesting discord, as
there is no agreement on optimal group size in research
on ICAs either. Collective action is argued to benefit from
larger groups, as it allows for a better spreading of risks,
but larger groups are also considered detrimental for co-
hesion and therefore thewillingness to cooperate (Olson,
1965; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). We return to this issue
in the discussion.
5.3. The Balance on Efficiency, Utility, and Equity
Apart from the ambiguity regarding group size, the new
initiatives can be conceptualized as falling into two cate-
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Figure 2.Maximum premium redistribution per organization. Notes: Information is missing for TongJuBao and Versicherix;
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Table 4. Categorization based on communication and group size configurations.
Communication among users
Yes No
Group size restrictions
Yes Besure, Broodfonds Friendsurance, Tribe
No CommonEasy, Teambrella Axieme, Lemonade, SharePeople
Notes: Information on Versicherix is missing; members of Tribe do group with members they already know, so they likely do communi-
cate via other means, but this is not structured through (or stimulated by) the mutual.
gories. The top-down organizations use risk-sharing and
redistribution as innovative tools, but institutionally they
resemble modern market insurance structures, while
the bottom-up organizations largely resemble their 19th-
century counterparts—including the fact that they can-
not promise the same degree of security as regular in-
surance companies do. Organizations of the latter type
therefore unmistakably represent a revival of mutual-
ism, operating between market and state, while the first
category might be better classified as a new alternative
within the market insurance sector.
The difference in how the two categories balance
on efficiency, utility, and equity makes clear why. First,
the dichotomy translates into a different vision of util-
ity. While organizations in both groups emerged to bet-
ter answer to policyholders’ needs (i.e., the utility do-
main) than their state or market counterparts, they dif-
fer in how they perceive these needs. The top-down or-
ganizations envision optimal utility in an insurance policy
that most accurately reflects actual needs (i.e., with pre-
miums that most meticulously represent actual risk pro-
files). With this vision they aim particularly to improve
utility for low-risk members. The bottom-up organiza-
tions consider utility to reflect a minimum security level
for everyone, including high-risk individuals that may
have difficulty taking out an insurance policy with private
insurers.Whether this vision fits everyone’s needs or ulti-
mately results in problems of adverse selection (i.e., risk-
sharing groups with an above-average number of high-
risk members; Akerlof, 1970) remains to be seen.
The implementation of utility is thus unevenly bal-
anced towards different target users, but at least im-
proving utility constitutes a core concern for all new in-
surance initiatives. An assessment of the balance in ef-
ficiency and equity, however, signals the clear division
between the two types of organizations. Typically, top-
down organizations strive for utility and efficiency at
the expense of equity, while the bottom-up organiza-
tions strive for utility and equity at the expense of effi-
ciency (Figure 3). That is, the first group organizes the
risk-sharing groups such that exactly the right amount
of premiums is paid, but can only do so by fixing the in-
stitutional setup and not giving members a say in how
the group should organize itself. While this makes the
pool governance and the decision-making process more
efficient, the consequence of low member involvement
might be that they perceive less procedural justice, e.g.,
on premium sizes or payout eligibility.
The second type of organization leaves much room
for members to decide upon their internal structure and
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Figure 3. Balance configurations for the two types of new insurance initiatives. Note: R stands for Resilience.
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criteria for payout eligibility, which, although it enhances
feelings of procedural justice, can result in a lengthier
and more difficult decision-making process and less ef-
ficient management. Although with time efficiency may
increase when decision-making processes have consoli-
dated and the formation of trust has rooted within the
organization (De Moor, 2015), currently both types of or-
ganizations seem to balance two dimensions at the ex-
pense of the third. If the two types of organizations con-
tinue down this road, it stands to reason that, when they
do grow up to be solid insurance alternatives, these ini-
tial differences will become more marked.
When we consider the number of members as a first
indicator, for instance, it should be noted that some of
the top-down organizations (Friendsurance, Lemonade)
have larger member-bases than the bottom-up mutu-
als. This is without doubt related to the fact that top-
down structures make it easier for members to sign up.
New members are not responsible for creating a risk-
sharing group with all corresponding institutional de-
mands, whereas in bottom-up organizations they first
have to find sufficient interested others to form a pool
with, and subsequently have to reach agreement on how
they want to organize cooperation. Even when new risk-
sharing groups can start from some basic institutional
framework, this may imply a higher threshold for join-
ing. Hence, the top-down organizations are more likely
to grow, and to do so more quickly, in the coming years.
At the same time, this rapid growth and lack of mem-
ber involvement raises the question of how the concept
of solidarity will develop and whether the top-down or-
ganizations will manage to keep their role and meaning
different from those of regular insurers. Simply forming
a risk-sharing group by itself may not be sufficient; social
identities have to be constructed to stimulate members’
willingness to help others or prevent them from filing ex-
cessive or fraudulent insurance claims (i.e., moral haz-
ard).Without active conveyance of solidarity and helping
norms, the top-down organizations could develop in the
direction of regular insurers, albeit with a different inter-
nal structuring of how insurance payouts are arranged.
With regard to the bottom-up organizations, it
should be noted that so far, few have managed to secure
a solid position as insurance alternatives. Some have had
difficulties in getting off the ground (e.g., PeerCover in
New Zealand), while others (like HeyGuevara in the UK
and InsPeer in France) have stopped their operations
after a few years. The uncertainty that comes with these
organizations (no full coverage, no payout guarantee)
might be too big of a step to take for people who have
gotten accustomed to the availability of insurance in the
welfare state. Hence, if the bottom-up mutuals want
to become serious insurance alternatives, they have to
reduce this uncertainty—for instance (like Broodfonds)
by creating their own reinsurance system. The crucial
task here is to do so in a way that does not jeopardize
the established equity. A potential pitfall of further in-
stitutionalization (and bureaucratization) is that it may
come at the expense of key values like responsibility
and transparency.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
So why, then, do we see new mutual-like organizations
popping up in many different countries? What needs do
they answer to and do they answer them sufficiently?
How are they organized and what are the institutional
parallels between these otherwise independently evolv-
ing initiatives? Can we expect these alternative organiza-
tional forms to proliferate and succeed in the long run?
While the phenomenon is recent, the questions are not:
They have been asked—and answered—with respect to
historical mutuals as well. These mutuals emerged in
the classical liberal era (early 19th century) due to in-
adequate public provisions with respect to, e.g., poor
relief (Ilcan & Basok, 2004). They grew in popularity
quickly, succeeded in alleviating their members’ immedi-
ate needs, and ensured sufficiency by offering additional
immaterial (social) support (Emery & Emery, 1999). At
the same time, their voluntary organization and freedom
to pose membership restrictions meant that large parts
of the population were never covered by mutual insur-
ance arrangements. In the 20th century, the mutuals’
services were therefore increasingly incorporated by the
state, making mutuals the founding fathers of the mod-
ern welfare state (Beito, 2000). Elsewhere, the mutuals
professionalized to compete with the growing number
of market insurers, trying to find a niche between mar-
ket and state in which they could offer the same levels
of security while maintaining their member involvement
and ownership advantage (Schneiberg, 2002).
Even though the newmutuals movement is still in its
infancy, we have seen that the story of their rise is unmis-
takably similar: to answer to the inadequate insurance
provisions ofmarket and state, this time in the neoliberal
era. Will the rest of the cycle repeat as well? Although
it is too early to say (we would be comparing a develop-
ment of two decades to one of two centuries), our review
does indicate that, already in their foundation, the new
insurance organizations seem to divide themselves into
a group that aims to cater particularly to the needs of
high-risk individuals, thereby rethinking the conceptions
of solidarity and universalism as implemented by thewel-
fare state in the life domain, and a group that targets par-
ticularly the needs of low-risk individuals, mostly in com-
petition with the traditional market insurers in the non-
life domain. It is therefore not unimaginable that, when
the two insurance types manage to secure a solid posi-
tion within the existing insurance landscape, they may
likewise affect the organization of both the welfare state
and market insurers.
This would, however, require that they learn from
the ‘mistakes’ made by their historical counterparts. We
have seen that while all new mutuals are attentive to
ensuring utility, there is room for improvement in their
balance on either equity or efficiency. If the organiza-
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tions are to follow their current development path, the
top-down organizations risk ending up similar to today’s
mutual insurance companies, having aspects of mutual
insurance on paper (in this case, risk-sharing groups),
without reaping the benefits in practice. Feelings of sol-
idarity and trust—crucial to keeping moral hazard oc-
currences low—may gradually be forgotten as the risk-
sharing group becomes more abstract and anonymous.
For the bottom-up organizations, on the other hand, ne-
glecting the balance on efficiency might become prob-
lematic if mutuals encounter problems of adverse selec-
tion. Low premiums and zero-to-limited risk differentia-
tion might, as we have also seen in the development of
historical mutuals (van Leeuwen, 2016), make the new
mutuals particularly attractive to high-risk individuals.
Risk-sharing groups with an above-average number of
high-risk members may encounter difficulties when the
number of claims exceed the resource’s carrying capacity.
For the new insurance initiatives to become resilient, it
is therefore vital that they improve their balance regard-
ing efficiency or equity, without harming the established
balance on the other dimensions too much.
In light of these conclusions, a word of caution is in
order. While we have stressed repeatedly that the initia-
tives are still in their infancy, it should also be noted that
our inventory of newmutual-type insurance initiatives is
by definition incomplete. We by no means claim to have
a complete overview; after all, new mutualist organiza-
tions may be being set up as we speak. Since the initia-
tives develop largely independently of one another, it is
difficult to get a grip on the available experience, and we
cannot claim that a third organizational form is not being,
or will not be, developed.
Frankly, the study of the role and development of
newmutualism is only just beginning.Whilewe can learn
from historical experiences, many questions remain
unanswered. First, as we have already touched upon,
the historical mutuals—not just those 19th-century mu-
tuals referred to in this article, but the older forms of
guild insurance as well—have also known various differ-
ent development paths. Some professionalized within
the bottom-up framework and, similar to Broodfonds
and TongJuBao, drafted multilevel reinsurance systems
to cater their insurance to more members without los-
ing the small-group benefits of informal sanctioning and
controlmechanisms. Others, especially towards the 20th
century, transformed into top-down organizations in or-
der to compete with private insurers. It is to date unclear,
however, why some mutuals survived while others did
not. This signals thatmuchmore can be learned about in-
stitutional resilience from a direct comparison between
some historical and current cases—to improve both the
current institutions’ resilience and the understanding of
the historical mutuals’ demise. Which institutional fea-
tures are crucial for resilience? And which may poten-
tially be harmful? More detailed case-by-case compar-
isons may yield insight into how the mutuals adjust over
time and can restore their balance towards resilience.
Secondly, more insight into the role of group size and
solidarity is warranted.While scholars have attempted to
estimate optimal community sizes (Casari & Tagliapietra,
2018; Dunbar & Sosis, 2018), we know little about why
certain community sizes seem to work well. What is the
number of people to whom one can act on the basis of
solidarity? Does solidarity even have to be directed at
specific individuals or can it be generalized to a collec-
tive group identity? The mutuals that apply restrictions
to group size base these restrictions on common-sense
intuitions, but how accurate are these? Given that risk-
sharing groups are the foundation of the new mutuals,
but their limits range from 10 to 50 to (in theory) infinity,
it is pertinent that we gain a better understanding of the
relation between group size and solidarity. Do solidarity
feelings increase or decrease depending on the size of
the risk-sharing group? And is this relation even linear?
Finally, we know that differences in the institutional
setup have important implications for individual and so-
cial factors that shape willingness to participate in mu-
tuals. Institutions could, for instance, both enhance and
crowd out solidaritymotives (Bowles, 2008). To illustrate,
whether or not the mutual provides an internal plat-
form for communication matters a lot for how solidarity
is perceived in practice, i.e., as generalized or the out-
come of a direct interdependence between members.
How do institutions shape social dynamics like a mutual
sense of belonging or internal social norms? What role
do such dynamics play for the willingness to participate
(and more specifically, to support others)? And lastly, to
what extent can digital communication platforms invoke
social dynamics similar to those that work in offline, lo-
calized communities?
Further research on the interplay between institu-
tional, social, and individual factors will enhance our un-
derstanding of the functioning of the new mutuals (and
by extension other ICAs) in our current societies, and ulti-
mately increase insights into the role such initiatives are
projected to play in the future.
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